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According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "scenario" first 
appeared in English in the late 1800s, to describe "a sketch or outline of the 
plot of a play, ballet, novel, opera, [or] story." It was first applied to the 
study of the future by Herman Kahn in his 1962 book On Thermonuclear 
Warfare. Since the 1970s, and the growth of scenario planning for 
corporations and governments, scenarios have featured a few key concepts. 
As Shell's scenario planning group described it in 2008,  
 
A scenario is a story that describes a possible future. It 
identifies some significant events, the main actors and their 
motivations, and it conveys how the world functions. Building 
and using scenarios can help people explore what the future 
might look like and the likely challenges of living in it. 
 
Decision makers can use scenarios to think about the uncertain 
aspects of the future that most worry them—or to discover the 
aspects about which they should be concerned—and to explore 
the ways in which these might unfold.... 
 
Scenarios are based on intuition, but crafted as analytical 
structures. They are written as stories that make potential 
futures seem vivid and compelling. They do not provide a 
consensus view of the future, nor are they predictions: they may 
describe a context and how it may change, but they do not 
describe the implications of the scenarios for potential users nor 
dictate how they must respond.... 
 
Scenarios are intended to form a basis for strategic 
conversation...  considering potential implications of and 
possible responses to different events. They provide their users 
with a common language and concepts for thinking and talking 
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about current events, and a shared basis for exploring future 
uncertainties and making more successful decisions.1 
 
In the last few years, the contexts in which scenarios have been developed, 
used, and informed decision-making have expanded considerably. As a 
result, the practice of scenarios has become both more interesting and more 
complex, with new types of scenarios challenging old assumptions about 
how to think about and plan for the future.  
 
The purpose of this essay is to survey the current state and future prospects 
for scenarios: to describe how scenario practices have evolved in the last few 
years; present an overview of the forces pushing scenarios in new directions; 
and suggest how the production, communication, audience, and service roles 
for scenarios may change. It begins with a history of scenarios, with a focus 
on their use in corporate strategy and decision-making. It then surveys the 
use of scenarios in two newer contexts have raised practical and theoretical 
questions about how scenarios can be developed and used: environmental 
and global change modeling, and national security and intelligence.  Finally, 
it looks at the future of scenarios, suggests how the development and use of 
                                         




scenarios will evolve in the next few years.  These experiments suggest that 
the fundamentals of scenarios is changing, and this opens up opportunities 
for new organizations to take the lead in developing the next generation of 
scenarios. I conclude with some suggestions about how GPPAG could 
position itself to become a leader in this new form of scenario practice, and 
in so doing carve out a unique and high-profile niche for itself in the world 
of academic studies of globalization and national security. 
  
The History of Scenarios  
   
Scenarios as a tool for planning and strategy emerged as a formal body of 
practice at the Hudson Institute, RAND, and SRI. Military war games; the 
rise of computer modeling in economics, operations research, and game 
theory; and science fiction all provided inspiration for futurists. In the 1970s, 
Shell Oil's forecasting group crystallized modern scenario planning. In a 
now-famous scenario, Shell forecasters described a future in which oil 
supplies and prices became highly unstable, thanks mainly to manipulation 
by OPEC. This anticipated the oil shock of 1973; Shell's prior planning for 
this contingency helped it respond vigorously to the crisis.  
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That experience was the paradigm-defining moment for scenario planning, 
and it established the way corporate scenario planning has been done since. 
Shell's experience crystallized the idea scenarios as plausible, internally 
consistent futures, illustrating how current trends and "wild cards" might 
shape the future. It established the core practices that scenario planners now 
follow (e.g., producing three or four scenarios that focus on on two or three 
key trends). It developed the argument that forecasts did not need to be 
accurate to be useful-- that their value was in preparing companies to face a 
range of futures, not THE future. Finally, it defined the service role for 
scenarios as helping strategists and senior executives prepare for a variety of 
contingencies.2 
 
As a set of practices and products, scenarios fall into three major types. Most 
scenarios are explorative scenarios, which either seek to describe possible 
futures that emerge from the intersection of different trends, or the futures 
that can result from different strategies. Normative scenarios describe 
                                         
2 Shell's use of scenarios has not prevented it from avoiding some problems, such as the 
controversy after the sinking of the Brent Spar platform in the North Sea: see John 
Elkington and Alex Trisoglio, "Developing Realistic Scenarios for the Environment: 
Lessons from Brent Spar," Long Range Planning 29:6 (1996), 762-769. See also Alex 
Wright, "A Social constructionist's deconstruction of Royal Dutch Shell's scenario 




desireable futures and how to reach them. Predictive scenarios seek to 
forecast, with some degree of certainty, how the future will unfold.3 Most 
corporate scenarios explorative, and are what Angela Wilkinson refers to as 
"actor-focused:" they place a single organization at their center, and 
demonstrate how current trends could affect its future. Often scenarios 
processes are driven by a need to inform specific large decisions, programs, 
or investments. Shell developed scenarios to better understand the future in 
which long-term investments would or would not pay off-- whether to begin 
a program for oil exploration that would yield results in a decade, for 
example. Other organizations use scenarios in long-term strategic plans, to 
better understand the environments they'll be operating in over the next 
several years. For a few, scenarios help prepare for a future that seems 
fundamentally uncertain: in rapidly-evolving markets and industries, 
scenario processes are treated more like martial arts training, promoting 
mental flexibility and organizational agility.4 
                                         
3 This typology follows Lena Borjeson, Mattias Hojer, Karl-Henrik Dreborg, Tomas 
Ekvall, Goran Finnveden, "Scenario types and techniques: Towards a user’s guide," 
Futures 38 (2006) 723–739. 
 
4 On the current use of scenarios, see Russell F. Kortea and Thomas J. Chermack, 
"Changing organizational culture with scenario planning," Futures 39:6 (August 2007), 
645-656. The broader use of futures methods in management is discussed in Jan Oliver 





The purpose of scenarios is not to describe a future that is most likely to 
happen, but to describe " a limited set of examples of possible futures that 
provide a valuable point of reference when evaluating current strategies or 
formulating new ones."5 Much of the value of scenarios has come from not 
from the products-- the specific visions or futures contained within 
scenarios-- but from the process of scenario creation. Just as the Space Race 
was justified on the basis of the civilian technological spinoffs and 
enhancement of America's global status, scenario-building exercises are 
valuable for the social and cognitive benefits it brings. When done with 
small groups of executives, scenarios planning become an exercise in 
community-building, an experience in which people bond by developing a 
common vision of the future. Scenario-building serves as a "trading zone" 
for the sharing of different bodies of technical knowledge. It widens 
participants' perspectives on the future.6 
 
                                         
5 Alun Rhydderch, et al, Scenario Planning: Guidance Note (London: Foresight Horizon 
Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science, 2009), 5. 
 
6 A good user's guide to scenarios is Wahid Bhimji, Guidance on the use of strategic 
futures analysis for policy development in government (London: Foresight Horizon 





For all of their utility and longevity-- scenarios have been used for decades, 
a very long time in modern strategic planning-- there are practical problems 
in the development and use of scenarios, and deeper questions about the 
continued utility of scenarios in today's world.7 
 
As a practical matter, rather than serving as a source of inspiration or new 
thinking, scenarios can reinforce conventional thinking.8 Scenario processes 
are quite sensitive to a company's current issues, and recent news events, 
which makes it harder to recognize and explore the implications of potential 
discontinuities.9 Even when the process does succeed in describing a variety 
of potential futures, McKinsey strategist Charles Roxburgh warns, "In the 
face of a wide range of possible outcomes, there is a risk of acting like the 
proverbial deer in the headlights: the organization becomes confused and 
                                         
7 Brad MacKay and Peter McKiernan, "Creativity and dysfunction in strategic processes: 
The case of scenario planning," Futures (2009), doi:10.1016/j.futures.2009.11.013. 
 
8 David Mercer, "Simpler scenarios," Management Decision 33:4 (1995), 32-40; Thomas 
J. Chermack, "Studying scenario planning: Theory, research suggestions, and 
hypotheses," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72:1 (January 2005), 59-73. 
 
9 Ph. W.F. van Notten, A.M. Sleegers, and M.B.A. van Asselt, "The future shocks: On 
discontinuity and scenario development," Technological Forecasting & Social Change 
72 (2005), 175–194. 
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lacking in direction, and it changes nothing in its behavior as an uncertain 
future bears down upon it."10 One reason organizations can fall prey to 
inaction is that vividly-written scenarios may be more engaging and make 
the future seem more tangible, but that very engagement make it harder to 
extract more general lessons that can inform strategic thinking and 
preparedness. As psychologists have found, readers tend to rate stories that 
have more detail as more likely, even though those details make stories less 
likely to happen; unfortunately, it's the details that make a story 
compelling.11 
 
There's also a structural disincentive to producing radical scenarios: scenario 
planners must balance their mandate to provide organizations with an 
outsider's view of the future and to shake up their preconceptions, against 
the need to maintain long-term relationships with their clients. This can 
encourage futurists to adopt their employer's language and world-views, and 
to be suceptible to the consultant's version of cognitive regulatory capture, a 
                                         
10 Charles Roxburgh, "The use and abuse of scenarios," McKinsey Quarterly (November 
2009), online at 
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com:443/The_use_and_abuse_of_scenarios_2463. 
 
11 George Wright and Paul Goodwin, "Decision making and planning under low levels of 
predictability: Enhancing the scenario method," International Journal of Forecasting 
25:4 (2009), 813-825. 
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process that "is not achieved by... [clients] buying, blackmailing or bribing 
their way towards control" of consultants, but the latter's "internalising, as if 
by osmosis, the [client's] objectives, interests and perception of reality."12  
 
More broadly, there is a growing sense that the future is now wilder and 
more unpredictable than in the past. Anxiety over long-term global problems 
like climate change (and worries about our inability to effectively address 
them); rapid technological and social change; the rise of China and India as 
economic powers; and the failure of mainstream economists to sound 
warnings about the current global recession, have created a sense that that 
tools we've used in the past to make sense of the future no longer work. At 
the same time, there is a parallel sense that new technologies and social 
trends-- the rise of Web 2.0, ever-more powerful expert systems, real-time 
monitoring technologies, etc.-- could serve as a foundation for new scenario 
techniques that work in this more complex and unpredictable environment.  
 
The nature and location of strategic action are different. Strategy is being 
pushed downwards in organizations, and the demand for more regular 
                                         
12 William H. Buiter, "Lessons from the North Atlantic financial crisis," paper prepared 
for the conference “The Role of Money Markets," May 29-30, 2008. 
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strategic reviews is increasing. The concept of the "strategic corporal" 
illustrates this sense. As Kevin Stringer explains, "In an increasingly 
complex interagency, joint, and multinational world that oscillates between 
conventional and nonconventional military missions," the noncommissioned 
officer has become "the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign 
policy and influenced not only the immediate tactical situation but also the 
operational and strategic levels as well."13 This is an environment that 
characterized by complexity, high stakes, uncomfortable levels of 
transparency (thanks in part to the strategic corporal's media complement, 
the "strategic cameraman"), and rapid feedback on decisions.14 In a highly 
fluid environment, it has become more important for field officers to think 
about the longer-term, strategic implications of tactical decisions; and to 
recognize that they're operating in much more complex environments than 
before. As Mark Carlton warns, "Because of the nature of future wars, the 
                                         
13 The concept was first described in Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: 
Leadership in the Three Block War," Marines Magazine (January 1999); Lynda Liddy, 
"The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education," Australian 
Army Journal 11:2 139-148; Kevin Stringer, "Educating the Strategic Corporal," Military 
Review (September-October 2009), 87-95, quote on 87. 
 
14 Josh Manchester, "The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman," Small Wars 
Journal (May 8, 2007), online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/the-strategic-
corporal-vs-the/. The challenges of these environments are described by Silvio Funtowicz 
and Jerome Ravetz, "Science for the post-normal age," Futures 25:7 (1993),735-755; 
Ravetz, "Post-normal science and the complexity of transitions towards sustainability," 
Ecological Complexity, 3:4 (2006), 275-84. 
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ability of the tactical commander to fight beyond the physical realm will 
determine success. The tactical commander's ability to employ 
nontraditional methods will be the difference between operational success or 
never-ending insurgency." 
 
Environmental and Intelligence Scenarios  
 
Corporate scenario planning was the default in "scenario" work for the two 
decades after its formalization at Shell. (Of course, there were various sub-
school of practice, and numerous internal disagreements over fine details of 
practice or philosophy, but these were largely invisible to outsiders and 
clients.) In the last decade, however, the uses of scenarios have expanded 
once again.15 Environmental scientists working in the IPCC and other 
international scientific agencies have built large, complex scenarios aimed at 
both forecasting the range of likely changes to the earth's atmosphere, and 
the impacts those changes could have on oceans, ecosystems, and human 
life. In the intelligence world, interest in scenarios has grown with attempts 
                                         
15 On the revival of scenarios, see Celeste Amorim Varum and Carla Melo, "Directions in 
scenario planning literature: A review of the past decade," Futures (in press, 2010). 
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to forecast disruptions and detect the "weak signals" that indicate the 
immanent appearance of different futures. 
 
Environmental and Global Change Scenarios 
   
Environmental scenarios present the consequences of large-scale changes to 
climate, ecosystems, and human habitation.16 While futurists have long been 
interested in environmental issues—hardly a surprise given that Rachel 
Carson's and Paul Erlich's pioneering work appeared at the same time as the 
first generation of futurists—the formal use of scenario methods to explore 
the impact of "future emissions of greenhouse gases and other climate 
forcing agents" on earth systems like oceans, weather patterns, etc. at the 
global or regional scale is of more recent vintage.17 In the 1990s, the IPCC 
began commissioned scenarios to describe the impact of different emissions 
futures; by the late 1990s, they were joined by the UK's Climate Impacts 
Program and US National Assessment, as well as scenarios by the WBCSD 
                                         
16 A useful overview is Paul Raskin, et al, "Global Scenarios in Historical Perspective," 
in Carpenter et al, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios - Findings of the 
Scenarios Working Group Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series (Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 2005), 35-44. 
 
17 Mike Hulme and Suraje Dessai, "Predicting, deciding, learning: can one evaluate the 
‘success’ of national climate scenarios?" Environmental Research Letters 3 (2008), 1-6. 
 
 14 
and Global Scenario Group focused on possible responses to climate change. 
(See the annotated bibliography for more on these reports.) 
 
Environmental scenarios "draw on science – our understanding of historical 
patterns, current conditions, and physical and social processes – and on the 
imagination to conceive, articulate and evaluate alternative pathways of 
development and the environment... [to] illuminate the links between issues, 
the relationships between global and regional development, and the role of 
human actions in shaping the future."18 Finally, they seek to explain what is 
scientifically certain; present a range of possibilities in areas that are less 
certain; and explain how changes will affect human life. As the IPCC 
explains about its greenhouse gas scenarios, "policy makers need a summary 
of what is understood about possible future GHG emissions, and given the 
uncertainties in both emissions models and our understanding of key driving 
forces, scenarios are an appropriate tool for summarizing both current 
understanding and current uncertainties."19 
 
                                         
18 Paul D. Raskin and Eric Kemp-Benedict, Global Environment Outlook Scenario 
Framework (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004), 2. 
 
19 Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Rob Swart, eds., Emission Scenarios (Geneva: IPCC, 2000), 
available online at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=10#anc2. 
 
 15 
They're produced and used in large-scale official assessments of climate 
change (the IPCC has been a pioneer in the creation of these scenarios); as a 
result, they're often strongly informed by scientific knowledge—in particular 
global climate models—than traditional scenarios. They're usually 
developed to illustrate the impacts of global change on human affairs—how 
rising sea levels will affect coastal cities and populations, how changes in 
rainfall and temperature will affect growing seasons and food security, or 
how smaller glaciers will affect accessibility of fresh water—or how humans 
and institutions can respond to these challenges.20 
 
Environmental change scenarios differ from traditional scenarios in a couple 
ways. Most are produced by people outside the futures world: the IPCC 
scenarios, for example, have only a few citations to futures research.21 They 
are often more quantitative than corporate scenarios, as they seek to 
establish ranges of possible changes to the global climate in the coming 
decades, and to explain how severe changes will be under different 
circumstances. The conditions under which global change scenarios are 
                                         
20 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Business and Industry (Washington: World Resources 
Institute, 2005). 
 
21 Göran Nordlund, "Futures research and the IPCC assessment study on the effects of 
climate change," Futures 40:10 (December 2008), 873-876. 
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produced are also novel: they're more like research projects that consulting: 
they're not commissioned by clients to address specific strategic or policy-
related issues. Ted Parson compares the contexts in which global change 
scenarios are produced to more traditional scenarios:  
 
In other domains such as corporate strategic planning, scenario 
users are usually identified, few in number, and fairly similar in 
perspectives, often situated within one organization or a few 
related ones. Users or their representatives can be engaged in 
key stages of scenario creation and application, to provide input 
on such matters as relevant choices, high-priority uncertainties 
and their plausible realizations, and criteria for desirable 
outcomes.... By contrast, potential users of global-change 
scenarios are vast in number and in the variety of their 
responsibilities, knowledge, objectives, capabilities, and 
authority. They... embrace profoundly different views of the 
nature of the problem (including whether there is one at all), the 
objectives to be pursued, the criteria for desirable outcomes, the 
range of appropriate and relevant actions, and the locus of 
relevant authority. In many cases, relevant decisions and users 
are unidentified or unknown to those creating scenarios.22  
 
Intelligence Scenarios 
   
The intelligence community's use of scenarios draws on the tradition of 
military war games and strategy, which have long been used to sharpen 
                                         
22 Edward Parson, "Useful global-change scenarios: current issues and challenges," 
Environmental Research Letters 3 (2008), quote on 2. 
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thinking about how allies and adversaries might behave in different futures 
or situations, and to prepare one's own forces for and responses to those 
situations.  With the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community began 
using scenarios to start thinking about new sources of long-run instability, to 
anticipate specific novel threats, and to deliver assessments about potential 
futures to a wider range of audiences.  
 
During the Cold War, scenarios assumed a bipolar world whose basic 
features were assumed to be stable; in the post-Cold War world, scenarios 
evolved into a tool for thinking about how the basic features of the global 
order might radically change. Thus the National Intelligence Council and 
Central Intelligence Agency each produced scenarios describing potential 
geopolitical landscapes in 2020, and the challenges the United States would 
face in retaining its status as a superpower in this world. Intelligence 
scenarios have considered how ecological changes could spark regional 
conflict over basic resources like water and arable land; how the clearing of 
summer Arctic polar ice could lead to a "land rush" around the North Pole; 
how milder winters in Kashmir, combined with shrinking snow-packs and 
pressures created by natural disasters, could increase opportunities for 
conflict between India and Pakistan.  
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In the last several years, in the face of a growing need to rapidly respond to 
changes in the global threat environment, the intelligence community has 
also experimented with using scenarios to identify potential new threats.23 
This has become more urgent since 9/11. Many of these scenarios have 
explored possible new forms of asymmetrical warfare, or "cyberwar" digital 
attacks on infrastructures like electrical grids and financial networks. They 
have also been used to isolate the "weak signals" that could help better 
measure the immanence of potential threats.The Singaporean government, 
for example, has developed an early warning system that uses scenarios to 
identify potential threats in the near future, and monitors news and open 
source intelligence for indications that pandemics, political instability, 
terrorist threats, or other disruptions are immanent. (This parallels an 
evolution in the use of weak signals methods-- the practice of scanning for 
unusual developments that harbinger some new disruptive innovation or 
trend-- from one mainly used as a research tool and input into scenarios, to a 
practice for promoting an organization's improvisational ability.)  
  
                                         
23 Global Futures Forum, Emerging Threats in the 21st Century: Strategic Foresight and 
Warning, Seminar 3: Warning for Readiness in the New Threat Environment (Zurich: 
Center for Security Studies, 2007). 
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How Environmental and Intelligence Scenarios Push the State of the 
Field 
 
Like environmental scenarios, intelligence scenarios push the boundaries of 
scenario practice: in each case they seek to respond to an increasingly 
complex, contingent world in which disruptions and once-in-a-century 
events are not the exception but the norm; in which the near-term future is 
harder and harder to forecast; and where the task is to understand not just 
how long-term trends may intersect, but to divine what new long-term trends 
are going to shape the future. But they craft solutions in very different ways, 
and to some degree are mirror-image twins. Environmental scientists face a 
challenge of creating scenarios that help readers understand the long-term 
consequences of actions taken in the present, and to see how the aggregation 
of small actions can lead to big changes in our environment and climate, or 
possibly sudden, catastrophic changes caused by the disruption of 
fundamental environmental processes. Environmental scenarios blur the 
boundaries between scientific models or simulations on one hand and 
scenarios on the other. Finally, because they're largely crafted by scientific 
panels or expert groups, without much guidance from either governments or 
 20 
corporations, environmental scenarios' connection to decisions has been 
weak and indirect. 
 
The intelligence community, in contrast, is creating scenarios that help 
readers respond to immediate threats, see where threats may emerge in the 
near future, and explore how to defuse them before they before unstoppable. 
As a result, intelligence scenarios have blurred the lines between scenarios 
and surveillance or intelligence-gathering systems. If environmental 
scenarios are influenced by climate models and scientific information, 
intelligence scenarios influence information-gathering and threat models. 
Finally, intelligence scenarios are very closely monitored by clients.  
 
The Future of Scenarios  
 
Environmental and intelligence scenarios represent two important departures 
from the corporate scenario tradition. Despite the fact that they operate at 
very different time-scales, deal with very different kinds of problems, and 
are used by entirely different communities, they confront two common 
challenges. Both are trying to identify the most important new sources of 
turbulence-- the things you really have to worry about, versus the things you 
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just have to worry about. And both are concerned with connecting scenarios 
to everyday action, with either seeing the long-term environmental 
consequences of decisions made in the present, or developing the tools to 
anticipate terrorist attacks and other kinds of threats. 
 
How to Improve Scenario Development  
 
A number of authors have proposed way to improve scenario development, 
to allow scenarios to do a better job of dealing with the wider demands 
presented by today's world.24 
 
First, scenario practice should be more reflexive. Very few scenario 
processes have formal review stages, or are structured to encourage 
participants to look back on their work after a few months or a year. Too 
often, being forward-looking translates into failing to learn from the past. 
                                         
24 These recommendations draw on Brian O’Neill and Nebojsa Nakicenovic, "Learning 
from global emissions scenarios," Environmental Research Letters 3 (2008); Simone 
Pulver and Stacy VanDeveer, "Futurology and Futurizing: A Research Agenda on the 
Practice and Politics of Global Environmental Scenarios," paper presented at the 
Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change 
(May 24- 26, 2007); Simone Pulver and Stacy D. VanDeveer, "'Thinking About 
Tomorrows': Scenarios, Global Environmental Politics, and Social Science Scholarship," 
Global Environmental Politics 9:2 (May 2009), 1-13. 
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But building learning (and feedback and reviews) into scenario processes 
would be useful for participants, clients, and futurists alike.  
 
Scenario processes should also become more open-ended and continuous. 
Scenarios traditionally have informed long-term strategic processes, multi-
year business plans, or big policy initiatives. As a consequence, they've been 
treated by consumers and producers alike as one-off projects. However, in 
an environment in which changes can happen rapidly, and strategic insight 
needs to be generated to inform more everyday decisions (strategic corporals 
need help making good decisions in the field), scenarios cannot remain 
static: they need to be dynamic, regularly revised and updated. This requires 
changing the relationship between scenarios, scenario creators, and scenario 
consumers: rather than structuring scenario projects as works for hire with 
fixed deliverables and deadlines, they need to be structured more like 
ongoing research projects.  
 
Third, scenarios should be designed to be fractal. In principle, scenarios are 
intended to be open-ended; in reality, they tend to be used once, and the task 
of applying their insights in other, more specific contexts is left to others. 
Building in opportunities for "localizing" scenarios either by their original 
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creators or by other users would give them a greater utility, expose issues or 
possible futures that the original project was not able to explore, and provide 
material for subsequently revisions of the original scenarios.25 
 
Finally, scenarios need to be more transparent: the underlying data used to 
create scenarios should be visible and accessible to readers. This would 
make scenarios and the scenario process more credible; transparency would 
also promote sharing and reuse of underlying data, allow different groups of 
forecaster to pool tools and datasets, and make it easier to compare 
competing scenarios or build on predecessors' work.26 
 
How to Make Scenarios More Useful  
 
Making scenario processes more reflexive, continuous, fractal, and 
transparent would improve the quality of scenario research and 
development. But according to many practitioners, for many clients the 
                                         
25 An example of a regional ecosystem scenario informed by IPCC and Millennium 
Assessment scenarios is Erin Bohensky, Belinda Reyers, and Albert Van Jaarsveld, 
"Future Ecosystem Services in a Southern African River Basin: a Scenario Planning 
Approach to Uncertainty," Conservation Biology 20:4, 1051–1061. 
 
26 Richard Whaley, "Comments on Chermack's paper on scenarios and theories," Futures 
40:3 (April 2008), 310-312. 
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experience of working on scenarios, working through different potential 
futures, and understanding how the future could differ from the present is as 
important as the quality of the finished product. This suggests that it's just as 
important to think about how to improve the way scenarios are packaged and 
communicated, and to develop tools to allow wider numbers of stakeholders 
to develop their own scenarios.27 This would open the prospect of creating 
scenarios that are as complicated and unpredictable as the world itself, and 
are as useful to strategic corporals, entrepreneurs, and people in small 
networked organizations as they are to corporations, federal policymakers, 
and the Pentagon? Two new methods suggest themselves.  
 
The first is to develop scenarios as maps rather than stories.28 Maps are a 
well-established tool in futures research, and have a number of virtues. They 
have an open-endedness that invites elaboration, structured speculation, and 
a consideration of how trends could play out over time. Large-scale or 
                                         
27 For example, MIT's Michael Schrage argues that "one of the consequences of 
technological innovation is that more tools are available to everyone, including 
policymakers. On the one hand, such tools allow for a diversity of experience, ideas and 
experiments to interact. On the other hand, it has given rise to the phenomena Schrage 
dubbed as "BYOA = Be Your Own Analyst." Customers want to be able to do more of 
the analysis on their own, that is, to interact more with the data:" Global Futures Forum, 
Emerging Threats in the 21st Century, 12. 
28 David Sibbet, "Visual Intelligence: Using the Deep Patterns of Visual Language to 
Build Cognitive Skills," Theory Into Practice 47 (2008) 118–127. 
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digital maps can present both general views of high-level trends that will 
affect the future, and present some of the background information that 
informs them. Maps are also very useful in workshops or other processes 
aimed at applying the general insights of scenarios to specific industries and 
companies. Not only can maps help participants organize and focus their 
attention, they can also serve as a visual and structural anchor for events, by 
giving all participants a common frame of reference.  
 
The second is to use games or simulations, to have scenarios inform either 
computer-generated training environments, or multi-person environments in 
which a number of participants work together to explore different futures, 
and understand the potential long-term consequences of current actions.29 
Games have several virtues. Games give users license to think radical 
thoughts: because they are approached as a form of serious play, they help 
unlock imagination. Games can draw on familiar skills: lots of people 
(particularly young people) who are mystified by prediction markets or 
                                         
29 Rachel K. Hanig and Mark E. Henshaw, "Needed: A National Security Simulation 
Center," Studies in Intelligence 52:2 (2008), online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol52no2/to-improve-
analytical-insight.html ; Albert A. Nofi, Recent Trends in Thinking about Warfare (CNA, 
2006); San Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future 




bored by narratives are unfazed by even complex, multilayered games. To 
the contrary, they embrace that complexity of games, which makes it easier 
to teach them about the complexity of the future itself. Games have the 
potential to teach new skills: the ability to think better about the future, see 
more possibilities, and cooperate with people. Finally, games can be used to 
study very large probability spaces. Scenarios traditionally have only been 
able to explore only a couple potential futures highlighting a few carefully-
selected trends. Games, however, can harness the collective energy and time 
of many people, and thus allow for a wider or more intensive exploration of 
many possible futures. 
 
GPPAG and the Future of Scenarios  
   
So what does this mean for GPPAG? Environmental and intelligence 
scenarios represent two fields that GPPAG is naturally interested in. 
However, there is an opportunity to move from consuming and learning 
from this work, to contributing to it.  
   
First, GPPAG could use scenarios within the graduate program, to knit 
together diverse researchers, create continuities between classes and alumni, 
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and at the same time help advance the state of the art. The methodological 
flexibility of scenarios would allow for the inclusion of researchers and 
students across the intellectual spectrum. For individual students, scenarios 
can serve as a way to think about the future in a disciplined but imaginative 
way. GPPAG classes could also work on scenarios connected by some broad 
theme, or focused on a particular region. For example, one entering class 
might work on scenarios around the theme of "Resources and Conflict;" the 
next class, on "Complex Networks, Interdependence and Insecurity;" 
another on "Strategic Leadership: Local Choices and Global Impacts." In 
this way, individual and class work can contribute to a larger GPPAG vision 
of the future possessing both breadth and depth.  
   
Second, there is an opportunity for GPPAG to reach out to the 
environmental and intelligence scenario communities, and in so doing make 
itself a central player in the evolution of this field. There is little 
conversation between these different communities. Intelligence scenario-
builders reference work from environmental scenarios from groups like the 
IPCC, but so far the two groups have not worked together on common 
scenarios, nor have they compared methods or innovations. One could link 
them together, for example, in an annual conference that brought together 
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researchers, policy-makers, and analysts to discuss recent work in each 
community, and developed a set of scenarios that synthesize their current 
research and speak to their current concerns. (These scenarios could also 
help set the research agenda for GPPAG classes for the coming year.)  
 
Finally, as an academic institution with close connections to policy and 
strategy, GPPAG stands in an almost unique position in the scenario world. 
It's an institution that can conduct long-term research on global trends, 
organize annual events, and over time develop a cumulative perspective and 
wisdom that corporate scenario planners cannot. Practitioners agree that 
scenario practice needs to be more reflexive, continuous, and transparent; it 
needs to to devote more effort to understanding how global trends play out 
in specific contexts and locations; and it needs to develop tools for making 
the long-term impacts of current strategic decisions visible to "strategic 
corporals" and their opposites in corporations and nonprofits. However, few 
futurists are in a position to develop these practices and tools; GPPAG could 
do so. This is not work that will strike anyone as radical or hard to 
understand; to the contrary. But doing the work that everyone in the 
community agrees "someone should do" to make scenarios more perceptive 
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and persuasive would put NPS in a central position among people thinking 





This bibliography summarizes major works in environmental and 
intelligence scenarios. It is confined to primary works that are of 
methodological significance, take a global view of environmental and 
security issues, and illustrate the kinds of innovations described in this 
report. For the sake of brevity it does not discuss national-level or other 
specialized scenarios. 
 
While they were produced over the course of a decade, the scenarios have a 
remarkable unity in their underlying assumptions. Most notably, all the 
scenarios in one way or another explore the consequences of either 
continued globalization or a retreat to nationalism or regionalism. 
Globalization, it seems, will be as central to the 21st century as 
industrialization was to the 19th. They also demonstrate some measure of 
skepticism in the ability of existing international institutions to deal with the 
problems raised by climate change, migration, resource wars, economic 
disparties, and globalization; the more optimistic scenarios argue for the 
ability of civil society or local groups to manage their own affairs and create 
innovative sustainable responses to global problems. Finally, they assume 
that information technologies have and will continue to have a profound 
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impact on the developed world, and will affect political and social life in the 




Ged Davis, Exploring Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 1997). 
 
Exploring Sustainable Development presents three scenarios of global 
change to 2050 that explore the impact of "the new" (information 
technologies, business processes, and organizational forms); "the many" (a 
global population of 9-11 billion people); and "the connected" (more 
interconnections between individuals, states, and economies). In "First Raise 
Our Growth!" economic growth takes priority over sustainability and 
environmental preservation, and eventually leads to a set of crises that new 
technologies cannot solve. "Geopolity" envisions a combination of bottom-
up response by civil society and local groups and greater economic 
regulation after nations, corporations, markets, and international bodies 
prove incapable of dealing with environmental crises. "Jazz" features "a 
world of social and technological innovation, experimentation, rapid 
adaptation, much voluntary interconnectedness, and a powerful and ever-
changing global market" that solves "social and environmental problems in 
the most pragmatic possible way possible." 
 
 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Business and Industry (Washington: 
World Resources Institute, 2005).  
 
The Millennium Assessment created four scenarios around two dimensions: 
a world driven by regional versus global institutions and responses to 
environmental challenges; and reactive versus proactive environmental 
policies. The four scenarios all assume growing demand for natural 
resources; continued food insecurity and global shortages, despite growth in 
agriculture and global trade; changes in arable land patterns, rainfall, and 
water access driven by climate change; continued depletion of global fish 
stocks; deterioration of ecosystem services, caused by destruction of 
wetlands and forests. Notably, in each of the four scenarios participants 
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National Assessment Synthesis Team, US Global Change Research 
Program, Climate Change Impacts on the United States: The Potential 
Consequences of Climate Variability and Change (Washington: US 
Global Change Research Program, 2000). 
 
Scenarios on the regional impacts of climate change, as projected in climate 
models developed by the UK's Hadley Centre and Canadian Centre for 
Climate Modeling and Analysis. The scenarios are largely projections based 
on the climate models, US Census demographic data, and economic 
forecasts, and contain less in the way of imaginative explorations of possible 




National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the 
National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project (Washington, DC: National 
Intelligence Council, 2008). 
 
Four scenarios exploring how the emergence of new global players, 
continued globalization, challenges to traditional governance, pervasive 
insecurity, and terrorism could shape the world to 2020. As the authors 
explain, "Davos World provides an illustration of how robust economic 
growth, led by China and India, over the next 15 years could reshape the 
globalization process—giving it a more non-Western face and transforming 
the political playing field as well. Pax Americana takes a look at how US 
predominance may survive the radical changes to the global political 
landscape and serve to fashion a new and inclusive global order. A New 
Caliphate provides an example of how a global movement fueled by radical 
religious identity politics could constitute a challenge to Western norms and 
values as the foundation of the global system. Cycle of Fear provides an 
example of how concerns about proliferation might increase to the point that 
large-scale intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of 




National Intelligence Council, Global Scenarios to 2025 (Washington, 
DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008). Available online at 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_global_scenarios.html. 
 
The Global Scenarios focused on two major questions: "How can the world 
attain a high level of sustainable economic growth given the rapidly 
changing geopolitical landscape of the early 21st century?" and "What will 
the balance of power look like in 2025 and to what degree might 
collaborative policies and frameworks shape the global context?" It presents 
three scenarios. In Borrowed Time, the global economy continues to grow, 
but governments and NGOs fail to deal with long-term economic and 
geopolitical problems it causes. In Fragmented World, political instability 
and a focus on local interests slows economic growth, eventually leading to 
an "overwhelmed international system [that] is collapsing under its own 
weight." Finally, in "Constant Renewal" civil society groups and new 
international mechanisms make it possible for states and organizations to 
respond to global challenges. 
 
 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Rob Swart, eds., Emission Scenarios (IPCC, 
2000), available online at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=0. 
 
Like the Millennium Assessment scenarios, the SRES consists of four 
scenarios, in this case featuring a global order that was either fragmented or 
integrated, and a global economy that either did or did not consider 
sustainability to be a priority. It assumes that global economic and political 
integration leads to faster growth and technology development, and 
sustainability is balanced against other priorities like economic growth and 
security. All four scenarios have potential highs and lows: a globally 
integrated world that sacrifices sustainability for economic growth is 
potentially the most unstable, but is also most capable of rapidly developing 
new technologies and energy sources; a fragmented sustainability-oriented 
world may be more resilient, but develops and diffuses new technologies-- 
including alternative energy and carbon capture technologies-- more slowly. 
 
 
Jacqueline Newmyer and Stephen Rosen, NIC-LRAU 2025 Security 




Outlines of scenarios on the global security environment to 2025, based on 
three expert workshops conducted by the Long Term Strategy Group. The 
scenarios featured retreat by the United States from the Middle East; a more 
aggressive and interventionist Chinese foreign policy driven mainly by a 
need to increase energy security; alternately, a China severely weakened by 
economic stagnation, loss of faith in the Communist Party, and growing 
power of dissident groups; an India weakened by conflict with Pakistan and 
internal resistance to globalization. 
 
 
Edward Parson, et al, Global-Change Scenarios: Their Development and 
Use (Sub-report 2.1B of Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1 by the 
U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global 
Change Research) (Washington: Department of Energy, Office of 
Biological & Environmental Research, 2007). 
 
Literature review that "examines the development and use of scenarios in 
global climate change applications. It considers scenarios of various types... 
and reviews how they have been developed, what uses they have served, 
what consistent challenges they have faced, what controversies they have 
raised, and how their development and use might be made more effective." 
 
 
Paul Raskin, et al, Bending the Curve: Toward Global Sustainability 
(Stockholm Environment Institute, 1998); Paul Raskin, et al, Great 
Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead (Stockholm 
Environment Institute, 2002). 
 
The Global Scenario Group has produced three detailed scenarios of global 
change: Conventional Worlds, Barbarisation and Great Transitions. 
Conventional Worlds describes a global system based on the continued 
dominance of today's institutions and industries; it is the global equivalent of 
a "business as usual" or baseline scenario. Barbarisation envisions a world 
in which global institutions, trade, and resilience break down in the face of 
environmental stresses, regional catastrophes, and local wars. Great 
Transitions describes a world in which international institutions, robust 
networks of small groups, cleantech and sustainable business find ways to 
ease global problems. Like the Millennium Assessment scenarios, these are 
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Paul D. Raskin and Eric Kemp-Benedict, Global Environment Outlook 
Scenario Framework (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). 
 
Not itself a set of scenarios, but an overview of major global environmental 
scenarios, this is an excellent introduction to the practice of environmental 
scenario development, and the current scenario literature. 
 
 
San Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the 
Future Security Environment, 2001–2025, McNair Paper 63 
(Washington: National Defense University, 2000). 
 
Discusses the major trends shaping the future of national security, and the 
use of scenarios "to create a path of logic that leads to practical strategies 
and defense policies and suggests the force structure to implement them." 
The report synthesizes studies on future security environments in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, and describes the major points of consensus and 
divergence among them. The report is not a set of scenarios-- though it 




UK Climate Impacts Programme, Climate Change Scenarios for the 
United Kingdom, UKCIP Technical Report No. 1 (Oxford: UKCIP, 
1998). http://www.ukcip.org.uk/resources/publications/ pub_ 
dets.asp?ID=11. 
 
Four scenarios organized around two axes: values (ranging from a 
consumerist society on one side, to a communitarian society on the other) 
and governance (ranging from concentrated national power taking primacy 
over global institutions, to an interdependent world in which global, local, 
and civil society institutions work with national governments and each 
other). 
